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THE STAYING POWER OF THE SOLDIERS' AND
SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF ACT
Roger M. Baron*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940' ex-
tends numerous protections2 to persons in the military service
of the United States. Its provisions are authorized by Congress'
duty to provide for the national defense' under the rationale
that military personnel should be encouraged to devote their
entire energy to the defense of the United States free of civil
legal proceedings and transactions which might otherwise prej-
udice their civil rights.'
The provisions of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
(the Act or the S & SCRA) are not intended to discharge the
civil liabilities of military personnel, but rather merely to sus-
pend their enforcement.5 Conversely, causes of action belong-
ing to military personnel are preserved by the tolling provision
of the S & SCRA which provides that the period of military
service shall not be included in computing time toward the
running of statutes of limitation.6 The tolling provision applies
to actions or proceedings "by or against any person in military
* Associate professor of Law, University of South Dakota. The author
wishes to thank Lois Gregoire and Peter Del Caro for their assistance in the
preparation of this article.
1. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501-591 (1990).
2. Id.
3. Id. § 510; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I. States are free to enact parallel
versions of the federal S & SCRA. See, e.g., Cornell Leasing Corp. v.
Henuningway, 553 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (Civ. Ct. 1990) (applying both federal S &
SCRA and New York [State] Military Law).
4. 50 U.S.C. app. § 510 (1990).
5. Id. Kerrin %,. Kerrin, 218 P.2d 1004 (Cal. 1950); but see Runge v. Fleming,
181 F. Stpp. 224 (N.D. Iowa 1960) (effect of stay was tantamount to a complete
defeat of claimis of an alleged illegitimate child who was denied social security
benefits because father died while in military and, at time of death, was not
furnishing economic support to alleged child).
6. 50 U.S.C. app. § 525 (1990).
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service."7 Accordingly, the S & SCRA also extends protection
to the civil adversaries of military personnel."
The protections afforded by the S & SCRA are extensive.
The Act prescribes special procedures for default judgments
against military personnel,9 and similar procedures for evic-
tion proceedings,' ° mortgage foreclosures,11 termination of
leases,'2 and numerous other aspects of the military person's
civil rights and liabilities."3 Perhaps the most critical aspect of
the S & SCRA, however, is its provision authorizing a stay of
"any action or proceeding in any court." 4 The stay is autho-
rized regardless of whether the person in military service is the
plaintiff or defendant."
This article focuses on the stay provision of the Act which
exists in its present form as it was enacted in 1940. The histori-
cal development of the stay is discussed together with a thor-
ough review of the last three decades of reported cases apply-
ing or refusing to apply the stay provision.
The S & SCRA provision for a stay applies to any civil
action or proceeding. 6 However, in reviewing the cases it be-
comes clear that paternity, divorce and post-divorce cases com-
prise the highest percentage of litigation which has arisen un-
der the S & SCRA.' 7 Among a wide variety of other civil cas-
es, the next highest concentration of cases appears to concern
7. Id.
8. le adversary of a soldier may run afoul of the statute, however, if a dis-
missal for failure to prosecute in the event the action is filed but not pursued in
timely fashion. Ricard v. Birch, 529 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1975); see also Zitomer v.
Holdsworth, 449 F.2d 724 (3d Cir. 1971) (dismissal for failure to prosecute af-
firmed where case was nine years old and had been on court's "deferred list" for
six years notwithstanding the fact its original placement in the "deferred list" was
because defendant was on active duty in the military service).
9. 50 U.S.C. app. § 520 (1990).
10. Id. § 530.
11. Id. §§ 532-533.
12. Id. § 534.
13. See geneally 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501-591 (1990).
14. d. § 521. Tihe text of this statute is reproduced in the text accompanying




17. See generally Annotation, Soldiers' and Sailos' Civil Relief Act of 1940 as
Amended as Affecting Mattimonial Actions, 54 A.L.R.2d 390 (1957) (pertaining to
"matrimonial actions" affected by the S & SCRA).
[Vol. 32
S & SCRA
negligence actions." A wide variety of other civil cases have
also arisen.
The last three decades of reported cases have demonstrat-
ed that the nature of the issues to be tried in the civil action is
highly relevant to stay requests. In particular, the nature of the
issues to be resolved has become the single most important
factor in determining whether or not the military person's
ability to litigate is adversely affected by reason of military
service.'9
Overzealous and unreasonable attempts to utilize the stay
to postpone and defeat liability have resulted in limited and
restrictive interpretations of the S & SCRA. The liberal inter-
pretations of the Act, on the other hand, can often be traced
to difficult cases turning on the harshness of the result which
would otherwise fall upon the affected military person. There
are, of course, a few situations of apparent injustice.
Advanced communication technology and the introduc-
tion of the videotape deposition suggest solutions in some
situations. Yet the overall problem remains. It is anticipated
that litigation over the stay protection provided by the S &
SCRA will not decrease. The right to personally appear and be
afforded a day in court is too fundamental to be finessed by
technology.
II. THE 521 STAY
Article II of the S & SCRA is entitled "General Relief."
The second subsection of Article II has been enacted as 50
U.S.C. app. 521 and provides as follows:
At any stage thereof any action or proceeding in any court
in which a person in military service is involved, either as
plaintiff or defendant, during the period of such service or
within sixty days thereafter may, in the discretion of the
court in which it is pending, on its own motion, and shall,
on application to it by such person or some person on his
behalf, be stayed as provided in this Act [sections 501 to
591 of this Appendix], unless, in the opinion of the court,
18. See generally Annotation, Soldiers' and Sailor' Civil Relief Act of 1940 as
Amended as Affecting Negligence Actions, 75 A.L.R.2d 1062 (1961) (pertaining to
"negligence actions" affected by the S & SCRA).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 110-81.
1992]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
the ability of plaintiff to prosecute the action or the defen-
dant to conduct his defense is not materially affected by
reason of his military service.
20
This provision, as well as all other provisions of the S &
SCRA, has been made specifically applicable to all courts in
the "United States, the several States and Territories, the Dis-




A "person in military service" is defined in detail by the S
& SCRA to include persons on active duty in the Army, Navy,
Marine Corps, Coast Guard and certain officers of the Public
Health Service.22 Reservists not on active duty do not quali-
fy.21 Civilians employed by a military service are not covered
by the Act."
It has been recognized that the stay provision of the Act is
only available in situations where the person in military service
is an actual party to the case.25 Accordingly, in situations
where there is a military defendant who has not been served
with process, remaining co-defendants have not been permit-
ted to invoke the 521 stay.26 This treatment is consistent with
that portion of the S & SCRA which permits the plaintiff to
proceed against non-military co-defendants, by leave of court,
though the action may be stayed as to the military defen-
dant.27
As indicated in the language of 52 1,28 the court may stay
a proceeding sua sponte. Litigants desiring a stay -would be
ill-advised, however, to rely on the trial court doing so on its
own. 2 The courts have not generally been sympathetic to the
S & SCRA arguments raised for the first time in collateral
20. Similar stay provisions are found elsewhere in the S & SCRA. E.g., 50
U.S.C. app. §§ 530(2), 531(3) (1990).
21. Id. § 512.
22. M. § 511(1).
23. Betha v. Martin, 188 F. Supp. 133 (E.D. Pa. 1960). Cf Cornell Leasing
Corp. v. Henuningway, 553 N.Y.S.2d 285, 287 (Civ. Ct. 1990).
24. Strong v. Potomac Leasing, 722 S.W.2d 479, 480 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
25. Moulder v. Steele, 162 S.E.2d 785 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968).
26.. Id. See also Smith v. Phillips, 323 S.E.2d 669 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
27. 50 U.S.C. app. § 524 (1990).
28. See supra text accompanying note 20.
29. "We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by not . . .
sua sponte ordering a stay of proceedings." Roqueplot v. Roqueplot, 410 N.E.2d
441, 443 (II1. App. Ct. 1980).
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challenges" or in post-trial proceedings where the military
litigant had an opportunity to request a stay prior to trial.3'
III. THE DISCRETIONARY NATURE OF THE STAY
The stay afforded under 521 does not automatically attain
as a result of a party litigant's military status. A civil legal ac-
tion or proceeding must be stayed "unless, in the opinion of the
court, the ability of plaintiff to prosecute the action or the defendant
to conduct his defense is not materially affected by reason of his mili-
tary service." 2 The discretionary nature of the stay as found in
this language has been described by the Supreme Court as the
"very heart of the policy" 33 of the 1940 Act which was in fact
a substantial re-enactment of the 1918 Act. 4 Clearly, the stay
afforded by the S & SCRA is one which vests judicial discre-
tion in the trial court, discretion which should be exercised in
the event of prejudice to the military party.35 A more auto-
matic form of relief described as a "rigid and undiscriminating
suspension of civil proceedings" had been rejected by Con-
gress, as shown in the legislative history of the 1918 Act.3 6
Prior experience with automatic stay laws provided by most
states in the Civil War era37 had proven that they were unnec-
essary and actually detrimental to the soldier's ability to secure
credit for himself and his family.3
30. Id.; Coffey v. Coffey, 467 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1971).
31. Strong v. Potomac Leasing, 722 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
In view of the fact no motion for a continuance or motion to
slay the proceedings was made by Strong and ... the record con-
tails no evidence that the trial court was informed of Strong's alleged
active duty prior to his motion for new trial, we hold that the trial
court had before it no basis for exercising its discretion on the issue
of whether to stay the proceedings. Therefore, there was no abuse of
discretion.
1I. at 481. See also Robertson v. Robertson, 532 So. 2d 1014, 1017 (Ala. Civ. App.
1988) (rejecting the argument that tie S & SCRA required a continuance, where
the argument was raised for the first time on appeal).
32. 50 U.S.C. app. § 521 (1990) (emplhasis added).
33. Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 565 (1943). It has also been described
as "the key to the whole scheme" of the S & SCRA. Id. at 567 n.2 (quoting S.
2859, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. (1918)).
34. Id. at 565.
35. Id. at 569.
36. Id. at 565.
37. See generally id. at 567 n.2.
38. Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561 (1943).
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The discretionary nature of the 521 stay was recognized by
the Supreme Court during World War II in Boone v.
Lightner,9 the only United States Supreme Court case to ad-
dress the 521 stay. Boone had been sued in North Carolina
state court for his alleged malfeasance as trustee of a fund for
his minor daughter.4" Although personally served in North
Carolina, he was stationed in Washington, D.C. as a result of
his military service.41 At trial, Boone's counsel sought a contin-
uance, invoking the stay provision of the S & SCRA.42 The
motion was denied. Boone's counsel withdrew from his repre-
sentation, and an adverse judgment of $11,000 was entered
against Boone, who was not present.4 The North Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed,44 as did the United States Supreme
Court.45 In what has come to be oft-quoted language, the Su-
preme Court held that "[t]he Act cannot be construed to re-
quire continuance on mere showing that the defendant was in
Washington in the military service."4" The "unless" clause of
521,'7 requires that the availability of the 521 stay be predicat-
ed upon prejudice to the military person's ability to litigate.4 8
The Court noted that the S & SCRA "is always to be liberally
construed to protect those who have been obliged to drop
their own affairs to t.ike up the burdens of the nation,"49 but
upheld the trial court's conclusion that Boone's absence on the
day of trial was a conscious decision motivated by litigation
The lesson of the stay laws of the Civil War teaches that an arbitrary
and rigid protection against suits is as much a mistaken kindness to
,he soldier as it is unnecessary. A total suspension for the period of
war of all rights against a soldier defeats its own purpose. In time of
war credit is of even more importance than in time of peace, and if
there were a total prohibition upon enforcing obligations against one
in military service, the credit of a soldier and his family would be ut-
terly cut off.
Id. at 567 (quoting S. 2859, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. (1918)).
39. 319 U.S. 561 (1943).
10. i. at 561-62.
41. Id. at 562.
42. Id. at 563.
43. Id. at 564.
44. Id. (citing the North Carolina Suprene Court, 22 S.E.2d 426).
45. Id. at 561.
46. Id. at 565.
47. See supra text accompanying note 32.
48. Boone, 319 U.S. at 569.
49. Id. at 575.
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strategy.5 ° The Court noted that Boone, who himself was a
lawyer,5' was able to be present at his own deposition in
Washington and depositions of others in New York City.52
Boone's own affidavit in the record suggested that he had not
even applied for leave in order to be at trial.5" Boone had
employed and orchestrated numerous counsel on his behalf
both before and after the trial54 at which he could have
sought "vindication," 55 but instead "he sought to escape the
forum and postpone the day." 6
In the wake of Boone v. Lightner, litigation over the 521
stay has evolved around two significant questions: (1) which
party carries the burden of showing prejudice or lack thereof
to the military person, and (2) are the nature of the issues in
the pending civil case such that the military litigant's absence is
more or less likely to be prejudicial? The first question was
addressed in Boone v. Lightner 7 and has been the subject of
widely divergent views ever since World War II. The latter has
uniquely formed its own personality over the last three de-
cades.
IV. BURDEN OF SHOWING PREJUDICE
The Supreme Court was requested in Boone v. Lightner to
hold that the burden of showing that Boone's military service
would not materially affect his ability to defend be placed on
Boone's opponents.5" The Court noted that no reference is
made in 521 nor in the S & SCRA as to who must carry the
burden of showing that the military litigant will or will not be
prejudiced. 9 Instead of resolving the issue, the Court simply
50. Id.
We think the record amply supports the conclusion of the trial judge
that the claim that military service would prejudice the conduct of his
defense, was groundless, and that the absence of himself and all of
his numerous and not uncompensated counsel of the day of judg-
ment was dictated wholly by litigious strategy.
51. Id. at 572.
52. Id. at 573.
53. Id. at 572.
54. Id. at 574-75.
55. Id. at 575.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 569-70.
58. Id. at 565.
59. Id. at 569.
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held that the placement of the burden of persuasion lies with
the trial court as part of the discretionary nature of the 521
stay. ° Even though the Boone opinion appears to place this
decision within the discretion of each individual trial court,
states have formulated differing philosophies as to placement
of the burden. An analysis of the cases indicates the evolution
of three general rules: (1) the burden of proving prejudice lies
with the party resisting the stay; (2) the military litigant must
show "something more" than merely being in the military; and
(3) the burden is on the military litigant to show actual unavail-
ability and that his rights would be adversely affected because
of his absence from trial.
A. Burden on Opponent of Military Litigant
A number of courts have taken the view that upon a mere
showing of military service, the burden falls upon the oppo-
nent to demonstrate that the military litigant's ability to repre-
sent himself is not adversely affected. For example, in Chaffey v.
Chaffey,6' the California Supreme Court reversed a modifica-
tion of custody order because the trial court had denied the
defendant's application for a 521 stay. The court held that
"when a prima facie showing for relief is made, the statute, in
effect, places the burden of persuasion, if not of proof, upon
the party resisting a postponement."" Relief from the adverse
custody order was granted to the defendant father who had
taken his children with him to Guam even though he did so in
defiance of a one- day-old ex parte temporary restraining or-
der. 3 The California Supreme Court noted that the father
had requested a 521 stay on the day of the modification hear-
ing, supported by counsel's affidavits 4 asserting that his mili-
tary duties in Guam rendered it impossible for him to be pres-
ent. In upholding the policies of the S & SCRA, the court ob-
served, "it is, of course, common knowledge that a military
60. "We think the ultimate discretion includes a discretion as to whom the
court may ask to come forward with facts needful to a fair judgment." Id. at 570.
61. 382 P.2d 365 (Cal. 1963).
62. Id. at 368.




man on active duty, particularly when overseas, is not a free
agent."
65
Florida's courts also place the burden on the party who
opposes postponement of a trial because of military absence to
show that the serviceman's ability to conduct a defense is not
materially affected.66 In Coburn v. Coburn,67 the critical custo-
dy aspect of a dissolution of marriage proceeding was reversed
by the Florida District Court of Appeal because of the lower
courts' denial of a postponement until the defendant's father
would return from Germany. The father had physical custody
of the parties' children in Germany. A letter was sent on his
behalf from the Army's Staff Judge Advocate in which a 521
stay was requested.6" The letter was filed April 9, 1980.69
The trial court delayed the proceedings for over a year after
receipt of the letter, but ultimately heard the case in the
father's absence in July 1981, apparently in an effort to resolve
the custody dispute prior to the start of the 1982-83 school
year.7" The court awarded permanent custody to the mother,
ordering the father to deliver the children "no later than one
week prior to the commencement of the fall school year."71
In reversing the custody award, the Florida appellate court
noted that "[t]he Florida cases are in accord that the act
should be construed liberally in the soldier's favor."7 2
In Texas, a World War Ii vintage case law similarly sug-
gests that once a party shows he is in the military, he is "enti-
tled as a matter of right to a stay" with the burden shifting to
the opposing side or party to show *that his "ability to
prosecute or defend is not materially impaired by such military
service."" Although this rule has generally been followed by
Texas courts,7 the Texas Supreme Court has endorsed the
Boone rationale which affords to the trial court itself the ulti-
65. Id.
66. Coburn v. Coburn, 412 So. 2d 947, 949 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
67. d.
68. Id. at 948.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 948-49.
72. Id. at 949.
73. Roark v. Roark, 201 S.W.2d 862, 863 (Tcx. Ct. App. 1947).
74. Kramer v. Kramer, 668 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Bond v. Bond,
547 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976).
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mate discretion in deciding how the burden of proof should
be placed. 5 At least one recent Texas case has approved the
trial court's placement of the burden on the military litigant
who "had greater access to the evidence supporting his posi-
tion."76
The state of Georgia has experienced a considerable
amount of litigation concerning 521 stays. The interpretation
of the Georgia courts, unique unto Georgia itself, basically falls
under the category of placing the burden on the opponent of
the military litigant subject to some qualifications. A strong
line of Georgia cases recognizes that the bare statement that
the applicant is actively serving in the military, with nothing
more, requires as a matter of law, that the court grant the
stay.77 If the applicant undertakes, however, to do more than
simply point out his active status in the military, such as at-
tempt to show his own impairment, he then falls subject to the
rule that his evidence will be construed most strongly against
him. 78 As a result, "[t]he court may attach significance not
only to what the affiant said but also to what he failed to say
about the facts within his knowledge." 7' Affidavits which sim-
ply assert unavailability and prejudice in conclusionary terms are
not sufficient to invoke the 521 stay. 0 Recent cases suggest
that the prudent military litigant in Georgia is wise to simply
assert the bare statement of active military service and allow his
opponent to utilize interrogatories"' and other discovery devic-
es82 to gain more information as to availability and the extent
of prejudice.
75. Womack v. Berry, 291 S.W.2d 677, 682 (Tex. 1956).
76. Power v. Power, 720 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
77. Smith v. Smith, 149 S.E.2d 468 (Ga. 1966); Lankford v. Mihollin, 28
S.E.2d 752 (Ga. 1944); Boothe v. Henrietta Egleston Hosp. for Children, 308
S.E.2d 844 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983); Vlasz v. Schweikhardt, 343 S.E.2d 749 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1986); J.L. Mays v. Tharpe & Brooks, Inc., 240 S.E.2d 159 (Ga. Ct. App.
1977).
78. Underhill v. Barnes, 288 S.E.2d 905, 907 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982).
79. Id.
80. Id. See also Allen v. Howard, 365 S.E.2d 546 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
81. Vlasz, 343 S.E.2d at 753.





Illinois cases indicate that the military litigant needs to
allege "something more" than merely being in the military in
order for a 521 stay to be granted."3 Illinois decisions fall
short of putting the entire burden on the military litigant.
Instead the holdings are calculated to encourage cooperation
by the military litigant in setting a date in the reasonable fu-
ture for disposition of the action.
The genesis of this position can be traced to Slove v.
Strohm, 4 wherein a paternity judgment was rendered against
the defendant who was a Marine stationed at Quantico, Virgin-
ia and subsequently transferred to Camp Lejeune, North Caro-
lina.8" The defendant sought a 521 stay on four occasions
throughout the proceedings but never "indicated when he
would be available and present in Chicago to defend the in-
stant action." 6 Judgment was rendered against the defendant
and affirmed on appeal, with the court observing that the de-
fendant "was given an opportunity to set a date at some time
in the reasonable future, but declined to do so."" Interpret-
ing 521 in light of Boone v. Lightner,ss the appellate court stat-
ed, "it is clear ... that the petitioner must allege something
more than his mere being in the military service." 9 A subse-
quent Illinois decision attempted to find "some balancing be-
tween the parties' rights," ° but did not hesitate to affirm the
denial of a stay where the defendant had been granted stays
on three prior occasions.9
The continued emphasis in Illinois under the "something
more" criteria appears to be on coordinating a suitable trial
83. Gross by Cross v. Harrell by Harrell, 477 N.E.2d 753, 754 (III. App. Ct.
1985); Plesniak v. Wiegand, 335 N.E.2d 131, 136 (111. App. Ct. 1975); Slove v.
Strohm, 236 N.E.2d 326, 327-28 (III. App. Ct. 1968).
84. 236 N.E.2d at 326.
85. Id. at 327.
86. Id. at 327-28.
87. Id. at 328.
88. 319 U.S. 561 (1943).
89. 236 N.E.2d at 327 (emphasis added).
90. Plesniak v. Wiegand, 335 N.E.2d 131, 136 (III. App. Ct. 1975).
91. 1d. at 134. "A party must establish ... that his military status is the
proximate cause of his inability to be present for trial." Id. at 135.
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date. In Gross v. Harrell,"2 the appellate court affirmed the tri-
al court's grant of a continuance on a mere showing that the
defendant was in the military service in Korea,9" but further
instructed the trial court to set a date certain for trial upon the
defendant's return and to grant "no further continuances...
for any reason having to do with his military service. " "
C. Burden on Military Litigant
There have been a few isolated decisions from various
jurisdictions holding that the military litigant has the burden of
showing all affirmative conditions and negating possible solu-
tions to his absence prior to successfully invoking the 521 stay.
Under this burden, the military litigant should be prepared to
show his actual unavailability, that his rights would be adverse-
ly affected because of his absence at trial, and that he has at-
tempted unsuccessfully to obtain leave in order to be present
at trial. State appellate courts in Louisiana, 5  Arizona,96
South Dakota97 and Nebraska,98 as well as a federal district
court in Illinois,99 have placed these burdens entirely upon
the military litigant. In meeting this burden, the military liti-
gant should be prepared to make his showing in affidavit form
based on the affiant's first-hand knowledge. 00
92. 477 N.E.2d 753.
93. Id. at 754.
94. Id. at 755.
95. Mayfair Sales v. Sams, 169 So. 2d 150, 152 (La. Ct. App. 1964) ("The
Courts have universally held the burden of showing that a defendant will be
materially affected in conducting his defense because of his military service re-
mains with the defendant and it is not up to the plaintiff to disprove same.").
96. Norris v. Superior Court of Mohave County, 481 P.2d 553, 555 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1971) ("The movant, in order to invoke the protection of the Act, must
make a showing of his actual unavailability and that his rights would be adversely
affected because of his absence from the trial.").
97. Palo v. Palo, 299 N.W.2d 577, 579 (S.D. 1980) ("Here appellant not only
failed to show that lie was unable to obtain leave, but lie also failed to show that
lie had not even tried to obtain leave.").
98. Hibbard v. -ibbard, 431 N.W.2d 637 (Neb. 1988).
99. Hackman v. Postel, 675 F. Supp. 1132, 1134 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ("Counsel's
affidavits do not state that Postel has made any attempt to secure leave to attend
the trial, nor does the letter . . . roin Postel's commanding officer state that
Postel is unable to be present.").
100. "-libbard's motion for a stay was not verified and was signed by his
attorney. The record before this court does not reflect that Hibbard presented any
competent factual evidence, by way of affidavit or otherwise, in support of the
stay." HibbaiT, 431 N.W.2d at 640.
S & SCRA
In Tabor v. Miller,'0 the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit upheld the trial court's denial of a stay where the mili-
tary defendant never claimed it would be impossible to appear
at trial and never suggested that the trial be scheduled during
his Christmas leave or on a weekend. °2 More than five years
had elapsed since the accident giving rise to the lawsuit had
occurred.0 3 It was also clear that the military defendant was
only a nominal defendant whose complete defense was con-
trolled and manipulated by his liability insurance carri-
er-which carrier had rejected an offer to settle within the
policy limits." 4 Some courts have subsequently cited Tabor v.
Miller as authority for the proposition that the burden of com-
pletely satisfying 521 rests entirely with the military liti-
gant. 0 5 It appears, however, that such an interpretation of
the Third Circuit's opinion in Tabor v. Miller is inappropriate
for two reasons. First, the Third Circuit made no such ruling
on the placement of the burden, but merely affirmed the re-
sult as lying "within the bounds of [the trial court's] discre-
tion." ''"6 Second, the reliability of Tabor v. Miller on such an
issue is greatly diminished by virtue of the fact the military
defendant was only a nominal defendant with no personal
financial risk of loss. 107
Curiously, Tabor v. Miller may be the only case in the last
three decades where application for a writ of certiorari was
sought in the United States Supreme Court. With certiorari in
Tabor ' being denied, Boone v. Lightner' remains the
most recent Supreme Court opinion involving the 521 stay.
101. 389 F.2d 645 (3d Cir. 1968), cen. denied, Stearns v. Tabor, 391 U.S. 915
(1968).
102. 389 F.2d at 647.
103. Id.
104. Tabor v. Miller, 269 F. Supp. 647, 650 (E.D. Pa. 1967), afid, 389 F.2d
645 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 915 (1968).
105. Norris v. Superior Court of Mohave County, 481 P.2d 553, 555 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1971); Palo v. Palo, 299 N.W.2d 577, 579 (S.D. 1980).
106. Tabot; 389 F.2d at 647.
107. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
108. Stearns v. Tabor, 391 U.S. 915 (1968).
109. See supra note 39.
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V. NATURE OF THE ISSUES As AFFECTING PREJUDICE
In determining whether or not the military litigant is prej-
udiced in his ability to prosecute or defend, the nature of the
issues in the pending civil case becomes highly relevant. Cases
reported over the last three decades demonstrate that this has
indeed become the single most determinative factor in resolv-
ing 521 stay requests. For example, in Cooper v. Roberts,"0 the
Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld the denial of a stay in a
proceeding involving real estate jointly owned by five brothers
and sisters, only one of whom was in the Air Force. Denial of
the 521 stay was deemed proper because the sole issue in that
case was whether the land could be divided without a reduc-
tion of its value, and the only relevant testimony would be that
given by experts.11
Another case which demonstrates how the nature of the
issues affects the availability of the 521 stay is Shelor v.
Shelor." 2 The defendant was a Marine under orders to report
to Guantanomo Bay, Cuba for a thirty-month tour of duty.
The defendant's ex-wife brought an action to modify child
support to which the defendant raised several equitable defens-
es and requested a 521 stay."' The trial court granted the
stay, simultaneously denying a motion for temporary modifica-
tion. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the stay
as to the modification proceeding but directed .the trial court
to adjudicate the motion for temporary modification. The
court pointed out that lesser evidentiary burdens are placed on
a plaintiff seeking temporary relief on child support and such
interlocutory relief would not prejudice the defendant's rights
upon the ultimate determination of the permanent modifica-
tion request.'
110. 722 S.W.2d 910 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).
111. Id. at 911-12.
112. 383 S.E.2d 895 (Ga. 1989).
113. Id. at 895-96.
114. "lBccausc of the interlocutory nature of the relief, the serviceman's ability
to conduict his defense to the action brought against him . . . is generally not
materially affected by determination of the interlocutory relief sought." Id. at 896.
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A. Liability Insurer as Real Defendant
The stay requests which are most susceptible to unfavor-
able consideration are those arising in cases involving liability
insurance where the military defendant is only a nominal de-
fendant with little or no personal financial risk of loss." 5 The
521 stay has been utilized by many insurers "as a means of
postponing and perhaps defeating liability."" 6 Courts have
not hesitated to recognize that the liability insurer controls and
manipulates the defense of the military defendant through its
investigators and retained counsel." 7 Authority for denying
stays in such cases stems as far back as Boone v. Lightner,18
wherein the Supreme Court recognized that insurance compa-
nies might seek to take undue advantage of the 521 stay.'
Discovery of the existence of liability insurance posed a
problem for some time, even in cases involving military liti-
gants. 2 ' However, in 1970 the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure were amended so as to expressly permit the discovery of
the existence and contents of any such insurance agree-
ment.12 ' Most state rules now follow the federal rules in this
regard.
Denial of a stay is most apt to occur in situations where
the opposing party has agreed to. look only to the insurance
coverage for payment.122 The same rationale for denial of a
stay has also been used against an insurance company seeking
115. See also supin notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
116. Hackman v. Postel, 675 F. Supp. 1132, 1134 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
117. "The insurance carrier, through its investigators and retained counsel, had
full control of the preparation of Captain Stearn's defense." Tabor v. Miller, 269
F. Supp. 647, 650 (E.D. Pa. 1967). See also supra note 104.
118. 319 U.S. 561 (1943).
119. "Such a nominal defendant's absence in military service in Washington
might be urged by the insurance company, the real defendant, as ground for
deferring trial until after the war." Id. at 569.
120. E.g., Childers v. Nicolopoulos, 296 F. Supp. 547 (W.D. Okla. 1969).
121. 28 U.S.C. app. § 26(b)(2) (1988).
122. "Plaintiff's counsel agreed to limit recovery to the amount of liability
insurance coverage." Underhill v. Barnes, 288 S.E.2d 905, 907 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982).
"Also at the hearing the plaintiff stated in a binding and enforceable fashion .. .
that the absent serviceman defendant will not be asked to pay any portion of any
judgment which is not payable by his liability insurer." McCoy v. McSorley, 168
S.E.2d 202, 203 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969).
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the advantage of a 521 stay in the name of its subrogee in
pursuit of a subrogation claim against a bankruptcy estate. 12
B. Personal Injury Claims
In situations not involving manipulation by liability insur-
ers, the courts have generally been more receptive to 521 stay
requests,, 24 especially if there are no eyewitnesses to the al-
leged tort other than the parties. 1 5  The military litigant
should be alert to the fact that the stay requests remain discre-
tionary with the court and instances of denial do exist. 126
C. Disputes Over Financial Obligations
In cases involving rather insignificant financial obligations,
the trend of the reported cases has been the denial of 521 stay
requests. 2 17 Similarly, where the relevant issues in the pend-
ing civil case are simply the "reasonableness of charges"1 28 or
the computation of "debits and credits," 2 9 stay requests have
been denied. At least one court has recognized the unique
argument that the military defendant's position was not materi-
ally affected but actually enhanced by his military service be-
cause he was earning a substantially larger salary as a captain
than as a civilian and hence in a better position to repay a loan.'3 0
123. Murphy v. Wheatley, 360 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1966).
124. E.g., Marts v. Cauley, 166 S.E.2d 46 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969).
125. Starling v. Harris, 151 S.E.2d 163 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966).
126. See Norris v. Superior Court of Mohave County, 481 P.2d 553, 555 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1971) (denying a stay request filed by the military plaintiff stationed in
Germany); cf Gross by Gross v. Harrell by Harrell, 477 N.E.2d 753, 754 (1l1. App.
Ct. 1985) ("We are afraid that Martin has come dangerously close to using 'the
Act ... as a sword against persons with legitimate claims against servicemen.'").
127. E.g., Mayfair Sales, Inc. v. Sams, 169 So. 2d 150 (La. Ct. App. 1964)
(grant of stay reversed in suit on NSF check in the amount of $256.04).
128. Jaramillo v. Sandoval, 431 P.2d 65, 66 (N.M. 1967) (paternity action
where fact of paternity was adjudicated with defendant's presence, but court re-
solved final issues of the hospital and doctor bills, as well as future support, in
defendant's absence).
129. Coy v. Raabe, 462 P.2d 214, 217 (Wash. 1970) (Opponent of military liti-
gant to be repaid money advanced in purchasing and maintaining real estate in
the litigation involving the exercise of military litigant's option to purchase. "The
question at issue involved the debits and credits attributable to Raabe. We do not
believe Coy's presence or absence could have materially affected that determina-
tion.").
130. Hempstead Bank v. Collier, 289 N.Y.S.2d 797 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967) (decid-
ed under both the S & SCRA and New York Military Law).
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In cases involving significant amounts of money, the
courts appear to be more cautious in assessing the potential
prejudice to the military defendant)3 It should also be not-
ed that disputes over financial obligations may trigger other
provisions of the S & SCRA not addressed in this article. For
example, in Richardson v. Fiist National Bank of Columbus,"3 2
the military defendant's house trailer was seized upon the com-
mencement of the creditor's suit. The case was continued four
times over one and one-half years33  because of the
defendant's absence in military service, although the soldier's
family had lost possession of the trailer shortly after suit was
filed as a result of their inability to post a bond. 4 The only
assertion of military service came in the form of a plea of
abatement."' The final judgment for the creditor was af-
firmed on appeal, with the appellate court pointing out that
the procedure the defendant should have utilized was not a
plea in abatement, but a request to vacate or stay the sei-
zure136 of the trailer under 531 of the S & SCRA. 13 7 Sec-
tion 531 is entitled "Installment Contracts for Purchase of
Property" and its protections extend to both real and personal
property.
3 8
The S & SCRA also affords special protections in cases of
eviction'" and mortgage foreclosures. 4 ° Notably, in ad-
dition to the 521 stay, there are individualized stay provisions
for eviction proceedings, 141 repossessions,142 and mortgage
foreclosures.'43 These individualized stay provisions are not
analyzed in this article.
131. Mays v. Tharpe & Brooks, Inc., 240 S.E.2d 159 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977)
(Denial of stay was reversed on appeal. Defendant was sued on his guarantee of a
$48,000 note executed by Rondak Construction Company.).
132. 242 So. 2d 676 (Ala. Civ. App. 1970), ceit denied, 242 So. 2d 681 (Ala.
1970).
133. Id. at 678.
134. Id. at 677.
135. id. at 680.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 679 (discussing the remedies afforded by the S & SCRA).
138. 50 U.S.C. app. § 531(1) (1990).
139. Id. § 530.
140. Id. § 532.
141. Id. § 530(2).
142. Id. § 531(3).
143. Id. § 532(2).
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D. Domestic Relations Matters
1. Divorce
An analysis of the 521 stay as applied to divorce proceed-
ings reveals that the less complicated the divorce proceeding,
the greater the chance it will be adjudicated. For example, in
Palo v. Palo,'44 the South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed
the divorce judgment against the husband in Germany. There
were no children and no issues of support. The sole issues
were granting the divorce and dividing the property.'45 Ironi-
cally, both parties were in the military service and physically
present in South Dakota prior to the lapse of the sixty-day
cooling off period.'46 The wife, who was also stationed in
Germany, managed to return to South Dakota on borrowed
leave time and borrowed funds. 4 The husband's request for
a stay was denied and the divorce judgment was affirmed on
appeal. 4
8
Divorce cases involving the custody of children 149 and
the assessment of support obligations 5 ' are more likely to be
stayed. However, in some situations the divorce itself may be




The issues involved in the setting of child support are of
such a nature that more and more courts are recognizing that
the presence of the military litigant is not essential to the set-
ting of child support 52 or its subsequent modification.
51
144. 299 N.W.2d 577 (S.D. 1980).
145. "The trial court granted appellee a divorce from appellant and divided




149. Kramer v. Kramer, 668 S.W.2d 457, 458-59 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (Both
parties were also military personnel, but "it is clear that the child was in Cuba.").
150. Smith v. Smith, 149 S.E.2d 468, 471 (Ga. 1966) ("It was error to deny
the . . . stay . . . and to enter a judgment for temporary alimony.").
151. Coburn v. Coburn, 412 So. 2d 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (dissolution
of marriage affirmed because of defendant's consent, but custody award reversed
and disposition of custody stayed until the defendant returned from Germany).
152. Jaramillo v. Sandoval, 431 P.2d 65 (N.M. 1967) (defendant's obligation as
[Vol. 32
S & SCRA
By comparison, child support is frequently set in the absence
of a litigant under the procedures of the Revised Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. 54  Furthermore,
there has been an effort by the federal government in recent
years to force the states to adopt uniform guidelines for use in
child support determinations. 55 As a result, child support is-
sues tend to be closely confined to financial data and, accord-
ingly, are even more susceptible in today's world to being liti-
gated in the absence of a party litigant.
1 51
3. Custody
Most courts have recognized that the resolution of custody
disputes requires the presence of the military litigant. This
would be especially true where the children are under the
present physical custody of the absent military litigant 5  or
under his or her legal custody.'58
Even in situations where the litigant does not have legal or
physical custody but possesses a significant claim, the litigant
has been afforded the protection of the 521 stay. For example,
in Derby v. Kim,'5" custody of the three-year-old daughter had
been vested with the mother at the time of the divorce. Upon
the subsequent death of the mother, the maternal grandmoth-
to future support resolved in his absence after the adjudication of paternity took
place with defendant's presence).
153. Power v. Power, 720 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); Shelor v. Shelor,
383 S.E.2d 895 (Ga. 1989) (permitting an interlocutory temporary modification in
defendant's absence).
154. State ex ret Adams v. Adams, 455 N.W.2d 227, 230 n.2 (S.D. 1990) (dis-
cussing the use of affidavits and discovery devices available to help generate the
most accurate information).
155. 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-667 (1990).
156. "[Jludges cannot decide child support by formulas and tables. When
tables are used, judgment flees .... Presently, the states are in fear so the
guidelines are born. In time, this mechanical jurisprudence shall disappear .... "
Schmidt v. Schmidt, 444 N.W.2d 367, 372-73 (S.D. 1989) (Henderson, J., dissent-
ing).
157. Coburn v. Coburn, 412 So. 2d 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (award
attempting to give mother custody of children in Germany with father reversed);
Chaley v. Chaley, 382 P.2d 365 (Cal. 1963) (award attempting to give mother
custody of children in Guam with father reversed).
158. Lackey v. Lackey, 278 S.E.2d 811 (Va. 1981) (children under husband's
custody but placed with husband's parents while he was serving on Naval vessel;
award purporting to give mother custody was reversed).
159. 233 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1977).
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er was awarded permanent custody at a hearing in the absence
of the father who had requested a 521 stay. In his motion for a
stay, the father asserted that he could be available as early as
January 19, 1976, but that he could not be present at the De-
cember 30, 1975 hearing date because he had used all of his
leave time for 1975.16 The trial court denied his motion for
a stay, but the Georgia Supreme Court reversed. Under Geor-
gia law, when a parent having custody dies, legal custody re-
verts to the other parent unless the surviving parent is shown
to be unfit or have lost parental rights.' 6 ' The Georgia Su-
preme Court pointed out, "it should have been obvious from
the nature of the issues to be litigated ... that the father's
presence was important."162
Military litigants involved in custody disputes should also
be alert to the provisions of the Uniform Child Custody Ju-
risdiction Act (UCCJA) 6 s and the Parental Kidnapping Preven-
tion Act (PKPA)'64 which apply when more than one state is
involved. The UCCJA and the PKPA are not analyzed in this
article.
4. Paternity
Clearly, the nature of the issues in a paternity suit war-
rants the presence of the military defendant. The Mississippi
Supreme Court recognized in Mathis v. Mathis165 that "a pa-
ternity suit is of such a personal and intimate nature that it is
implicit that appellant's absence materially affects his defense
unless a specific finding is made to the contrary. "166 The ad-
verse judgment of paternity was rendered while the defendant
was serving in the Navy in waters off Vietnam. 16 In reversing
the judgment, the Mississippi Supreme Court indicated that
the defendant should be given a reasonable opportunity to
defend, but that his failure to appear at his first reasonable op-
160. Id. at 157.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 158.
163. E.g., Brown v. Brown, 493 So. 2d 961 (Miss. 1986). See id. at 964 n.1 for
discussion of UCCJA implications.
164. E.g., Robertson v. Robertson, 532 So. 2d 1014 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988).
165. 236 So. 2d 755 (Miss. 1970).
166. Id. at 756-57.
167. Id. at 756.
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portunity warranted a final disposition of the case in his ab-
sence." 8  A similar result was attained in Stringfellow v.
Whichelo,6 9 a Rhode Island case where the defendant ap-
peared on the first three days of trial, but was unable to be
present thereafter because his military leave of absence had ex-
pired. 7 ' The trial court proceeded in the defendant's ab-
sence on a default basis and the Rhode Island Supreme Court
eventually sustained the defendant's exception to such pro-
ceedings, relying on the 521 stay provision of the the S &
SCRA.' 7 ' The court noted that prejudice to the absent defen-
dant was easily found in the record. The trial court itself had
expressed concerns "about the necessity of respondent's pres-
ence for his own protection,"72 thereby giving the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court a basis from which to conclude that the
trial court "inferentially found that respondent's military ser-
vice materially affected his ability to defend the case."'
Although the absence of the defendant in a paternity ac-
tion is highly prejudicial, the courts have also recognized the
needs of the child and have accordingly shown little patience
to military defendants who fail to cooperate in making
themselves available in reasonable fashion.
174
5. Contempt Proceedings
The courts have shown little sympathy to military litigants
in contempt proceedings where there has been a failure to
comply with one or more of the court's previous orders.
175
168. id. at 757.
169. 230 A.2d 858 (R.I. 1967).
170. The hearing took place on January 5, 6 and 12, 1966. His leave expired
oil January 17, 1966. Id. at 859.
171. Id. at 860.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. "However, should the trial court determine within its discretion that ap-
pellant fails to appear at the first reasonable opportunity to do so after the ren-
dition of this opinion, then the chancellor may finally dispose of the case." Mathis
v. Mathis, 236 So. 2d 755, 757 (Miss. 1970); "He was given an opportunity to set
a date at some time in the reasonable future, but declined to do so .... [The S
& SCRA] may not be used as a sword against persons with legitimate claims
against servicemen." Slove v. Strohm, 236 N.E.2d 326, 328 (III. App. Ct. 1968); see
also Theresa G. v. Eric L., 506 N.Y.S.2d 948 (Fam. Ct. 1986) (denying a stay
pending the respondent's return from Germany at some unspecified future date).
175. Baker v. Baker, 601 P.2d 433 (N.M. 1979).
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Continued contemptuous behavior has, on at least one occa-
sion, additionally influenced the court to exercise its discretion
against a 521 stay in a related modification proceeding. In
Hibbard v. Hibbard,"7 6 the father failed "to comply with the
court's visitation orders" and "for nearly 3 years intentionally
and effectively denied visitation of his minor children with
their natural mother."'" The mother's response was to insti-
tute a modification of custody proceeding in which she was
successful.
The father's contemptuous behavior not only served as the
grounds warranting the change in custody,'78 but also influ-
enced the court adversely in its consideration of his request for
a 521 stay of the modification proceeding. 17 9
E. Defense of a Judgment
Occasionally a military litigant may find him or herself in
the position of having to defend a favorable judgment. Existing
case law indicates that the litigant's ability to defend a judg-
ment while on appeal is not materially affected by military ser-
vice. 8 ° It has also been held that a litigant's ability to defend
against a motion to vacate or set aside a judgment is not ad-
versely affected by reason of military service if the grounds
asserted are jurisdictional in nature.' 8 '
Again, appellant misconstrues the nature of the proceedings in this
case . . . the only matters the trial court decided were that appellant
had failed to comply with the visitation provisions of a custody or-
der.... The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act was passed to
give extra protection to military personnel. It certainly did not give a
license to a serviceman to ignore lawful civil orders ....
Id. at 436. See also Roberts v. Fuhr, 523 So. 2d 20, 29 (Miss. 1987) (the father
was not allowed to invoke the S & SCRA because, inter alia, he was in contempt
of a visitation order firom a Mississippi court-relief friom which court he himself
originally sought and to which court he had "submitted himself ... throughout
the years of this controversy.") and Wheless v. Wheless, 169 S.E.2d 813 (Ga. 1969)
(denial of stay deemed harmless error where husband won on contempt issues).
176. 431 N.W.2d 637 (Neb. 1988).
177. Id. at 639.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 640.
180. Kesler v. Kesler, 682 S.W.2d 44, 45 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) ("We have
coiclided the ability of husband to prosecute this appeal, as would be true in
most every appeal, was not materially affected by his military service.").
181. Wheahon v. Whealton, 63 Cal. Rptr. 291, 297 (Cal. 1967).
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VI. ESTOPPEL, WAIVER, AND BAD FAITH
Where a military litigant remarries in reliance on the valid-
ity of a divorce decree, he may be estopped from subsequently
requesting that the decree be vacated because of
non-compliance with the the S & SCRA."' It has also been
held that a military litigant who seeks the aid of court may be
estopped from subsequently invoking the 521 stay in regard to
selective portions of that court's disposition.'"
Waiver of the opportunity to apply for a 521 stay may
occur if the military litigant has previously indicated a willing-
ness to try the case in absentia.'84 A 521 stay has also been
denied where it appeared the military litigant had acted in bad
faith by failing to have previously proceeded with the action
when given the opportunity to do so.
85
On at least one occasion a military litigant involved in a
multi-state divorce dispute found that the state court of his
choosing (Mississippi) granted his wife a stay of proceedings
because of the "gamesmanship" in which he was engaged. His
"gamesmanship" was simply successfully invoking the 521 stay
in the state court of her choosing (California). 86  His
"gamesmanship" did not serve to deny him the 521 stay in
California, but it appeared to create a reciprocal common law
stay for his non-military spouse in Mississippi.
182. Roqueplot v. Roqueplot, 410 N.E.2d 441, 443 (11. App. Ct. 1980).
183. "Chancellor Malski overruled Roberts' motion for a stay on grounds that
Roberts should not be permitted to selectively invoke the protection of the S &
SCRA, after having so recently sought, to his benefit, the services of the Missis-
sippi Cotrts." Roberts v. Fuhr, 523 So. 2d 20, 28 (Miss. 1987). See also discussion
of Robeit, supra note 175.
184. "It would further appear that the defendant has waived his right to utilize
[521] in that he has appeared in the action on at least two occasions through
attorneys of his own choice and ... indicated that they were prepared to try the
matter even in the absence of the defendant." Deacon v. Witham, 499 N.Y.S.2d
317, 319 (1985).
185. "lie the instant case, we agree ... that the Appellant was guilty of bad
faith, and did not diligently prosecute his action when he had full opportunity to
do so." Robbins v. Robbins, 193 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
"Based upon the record before this court with its strong suggestions of bad faith
on the part of the Debtor, this court will not indefinitely postpone the trial of
this matter as requested by Debtor." In re Diaz, 82 B.R. 162, 165 (Bankr. M.D.
Ga. 1988) (debtor was available for trial five weeks before he was required to re-
port to Germany but did not request trial prior to departure).
186. Brown v. Brown, 493 So. 2d 961, 964 (Miss. 1986).
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VII. THE PLAUSIBLE NATURE OF THE REQUEST
Success in invoking a 521 stay is directly related to the
reasonableness of the request. The more plausible the request,
the more likely it will be granted."8 7 Unreasonable requests
or repeated requests for a stay may be an indication that the
litigant is attempting to utilize the S & SCRA as part of his or
her litigation strategy, which the Supreme Court has declared
is an unworthy use of the Act.'88
Unreasonable requests for a 521 stay are frequently seen
in those cases where the military defendant is a nominal defen-
dant only, subject to the control of the liability insurer who is
conducting the defense. For example, in Underhill v.
Barnes,18 9 the defendant requested a stay for the entire "peri-
od of the defendant's service in the Navy plus sixty days."190
Notably, the defendant had not even enlisted in the Navy until
after the accident giving rise to the lawsuit.' 9 ' The trial court
denied the stay and the Georgia appellate court affirmed, ob-
serving that plaintiff's counsel had agreed to limit recovery to
the amount of liability insurance coverage and that the trial of
the case had been pending for five years. 9 ' Similar results
have been seen in other cases where the nominal defendants
had tendered requests for "indefinite stays."113
The 521 stay may be entered anytime during the period of
the litigant's military service "or within sixty days thereaf-
187. Bond v. Bond, 547 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977) (finding the trial
court's denial of a stay for two weeks until the appellant was retired from tile Air
Force to be an abuse of discretion).
188. "We think ... that tie absence of [Boone] . . .on the day of judgment
was dictated wholly by litigation strategy .... But in some few cases absence
may be a policy, instead of the result of military service, and discretion is vested
in the courts to see that the immunities of the Act are not put to such unworthy
use." Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943).
189. 288 S.E.2d 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982).
190. Id. at 906.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 907.
193. I-lackinan v. Postel, 675 F. Supp. 1132, 1133 (N.D. Il. 1988) (The court
denied a motion for indefinite stay, noting that "[tlhe fact that the movant is in-
sured and is represented by counsel ... is a factor to be considered."); Tabor v.
Miller, 389 F.2d 645. (3d Cir. 1968); see also supra notes 101-06 and accompanying
text.
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ter."' 04 The stay may be ordered for any length of time up to
"the period of military service and three months thereaf-
ter."19
5
It has been recognized that the S & SCRA was not intend-
ed "to shield a defendant from trial for such duration as his
voluntary, peacetime enlistment might provide, or as long
thereafter as he might choose to stay on active duty."9 6 The
reasonableness of the stay request is, of course, affected by the
location of the military litigant's station of duty. It has been
generally recognized that the military services have been "ex-
tremely cooperative" in making stateside personnel available
for court appearances.'97 Tours of duty overseas are rarely
greater than two years in length.' 9 Within these parameters
the courts have generally accommodated military personnel
serving in places like Germany,' 9 9  Korea ,200 and
Vietnam, 20 1 with significant grants of stay designed to coin-
cide with their ultimate return to the United States. There are
cases, however, where the overseas defendant has been expect-
ed to return for trial prior to the conclusion of his or her over-
seas tour of duty.
2 °2
194. 50 U.S.C. app. § 521 (1990).
195. Id. § 524.
196. Keefe v. Spangeiiberg, 533 F. Supp. 49, 50 (W.D. Okla. 1981) (granting a
continuance for one nionth, but denying a stay request until the defendant's
expected date of discharge three years later).
197. Zitomer v. loldsworth, 449 F.2d 724, 725 n.2 (3d Cir. 1971).
198. Id.
199. Coburn v. Coburn, 412 So. 2d 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (by virtue
of the relief given in appellate court, appellant secured a de facto stay of almost
two years-the trial court had denied appellant's request for a 521 stay and was
reversed on appeal).
200. Gross v. Harrell, 477 N.E.2d 753 (I1. App. Ct. 1985) (stay of approxi-
mately one year's length affirmed for defendant in Korea).
201. Childers v. Nicolopoulos, 296 F. Supp. 547, 548 (W.D. Okla. 1979) (stay
granted until defenidant's return firom Vietnam in May of 1969).
202. Norris %,. Superior Court, 481 P.2d 553 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971) (denying
relief from trial court's denial of stay but instructing trial court to give "ample
time" to the litigants in Germany to comply with discovery orders); see also
Hibbard v. Hibbard, 431 N.W.2d 637 (Neb. 1988) (affirming adverse judgment
against husband stationed in England where husband failed to use 38 day leave
stateside to resolve pending action filed by ex-wife).
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VIII. PROCEDURAL MATTERS
A. Discovery Devices
In recent years, the tools of discovery have taken on a
greater role in resolving 521 stay requests both as to the issue
of prejudice to the military litigant20° and as to his or her even-
tual availability for trial.0 4
Use of the video tape deposition has also been suggested
as a possible solution to the military litigant's absence. In Keefe
v. Spangenberg,2°5 the court denied the defendant's request
for a stay, but granted a one month continuance to enable the
defendant to arrange for leave or furlough." 6 Alternatively,
the court suggested the use of a video tape deposition, noting
that the defendant's "testimony, appearance, mannerisms, into-
nations and other means of presenting his defense and evaluat-
ing his credibility will be before the jury. "207
Video tape depositions are authorized by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 20 8 and are certainly a credible and
effective way of presenting the testimony of non-party witness-
es. However, a party's ability to either prosecute or defend an
action requires much more than just preserved testimony.
There is no substitute for being personally present during the
course of a trial or hearing. Countless trial decisions are predi-
cated upon the events as they arise. A video tape deposition
does not afford the party litigant spontaneity in his or her
representation at trial.
203. "[P]lainuiff would not be precluded from seeking information . . . that
might show that his ability to conduct his defense would not materially be affect-
ed by his military service . Vlasz v. Schweikhardt, 343 S.E.2d 749, 753 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1986).
204. "Tharpe should under proper discovery procedure be able to determine
when Dr. Mays will be available to defend in a future court proceeding .
Mays v. 'liarpe & Brooks, 240 S.E.2d 159, 161 (Ca. Ct. App. 1977).
205. 533 F. Supp. 49 (W.D. Okla. 1981).
206. Id. at 50.
207. Id. See also In re Diaz, 82 B.R. 162, 165 (Bankr. Ga. 1988) ("Court re-
porters may take depositions in Germany including video tape depositions for use
at trials in this country.").
208. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4).
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B. Preservation of Other Defenses
Occasionally the first response submitted by a military
defendant to a claim filed against him is a request for a 521
stay. This may be done pro se or with the assistance of counsel.
Military personnel should be cautious in proceeding in such a
manner because a few courts have held that a request for a
521 stay, by itself, constitutes a general appearance to the ac-
tion, with the defendant waiving his right to challenge the
court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him.0 9 Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 210 and most state court
rules the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, as well as certain other defenses, are waived if not
asserted in the first motion or responsive pleading filed on
behalf of the defendant.2 1 ' Nothing contained in the S &
SCRA serves to negate such a waiver.
IV. CONCLUSION
The 521 stay afforded by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil
Relief Act is clearly of a discretionary nature designed to ac-
commodate the military litigant who is truly prejudiced in his
ability to prosecute or defend the lawsuit to which he is a par-
ty. Unfortunately, some courts have placed too much of a bur-
den on the military litigant in establishing prejudice. A few of
those decisions were affected by other factors such as the ma-
nipulation of the nominal military defendant by his liability
insurer 212 or contemptuous conduct by the party invoking
the stay. 23 The burden should not fall entirely on the mov-
ant for a 521 stay to show all affirmative conditions and negate
all possible solutions. The assertion of a litigant's military ser-
vice should cause a sufficient amount of inquiry by the court
209. Artis-Wergin v. Artis-Wergin, 444 N.W.2d 750 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989); Vara
v. Vara, 171 N.E.2d 384 (C.P. Ohio 1961). But see O'Neill v O'Neill, 515 So. 2d
1208, 1210-11 (Miss. 1987) (reversing trial court because of language in the
soldier's request that said "[t]his request is not to be construed as an appear-
ance").
210. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 12.
211. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1).
212. Tabor v. Miller, 389 F.2d 642 (3d Cir. 1968), cen. denied, 391 U.S. 915
(1968).
213. Hibbard v. Hibbard, 431 N.W.2d 637 (Neb. 1988).
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and parties that an accurate determination of prejudice or lack
thereof is made.
Undoubtedly, the 521 stay has been invoked on a number
of occasions for unworthy purposes and the courts have re-
sponded by denying those requests for a variety of reasons.
Those reasons include bad faith, estoppel, waiver, a recogni-
tion of who is the real litigant, and whether or not the stay is
sought purely for strategic reasons.
The nature of the issues to be litigated in the pending civil
action is highly relevant and has become the single- most im-
portant point of inquiry in resolving stay requests. Many issues
warrant the personal appearance of the military litigant. It is
hazardous to attempt to list or define the universe of issues
where the personal appearance of the litigant is warranted
because such a list may omit truly significant issues. Certainly
included in that universe are custody disputes, paternity ac-
tions, and numerous other significant civil controversies. Ex-
cluded from that universe might be minor financial controver-
sies, child support issues, simple divorce proceedings, and
appeals.
In cases involving liability insurers and nominal military
defendants, it is suggested that only plausible requests for a stay
should be entertained and that courts should not hesitate to
determine at as early a stage as possible who is controlling the
defense. Attempts to utilize 521 to postpone and defeat liabili-
ty should not be tolerated.214
The courts have demonstrated that they are receptive to
plausible requests for 521 stays. The unreasonable attempts to
invoke 521 have generated a significant amount of case law
and have been the focus of the discussion in this article.
Truly reasonable requests for a 521 stay should be hon-
ored by the courts and, where the issues warrant, every effort
should be made to schedule a hearing date so that the military
litigant will have a realistic opportunity to be present. There is
no adequate alternative to having a party physically present for
his day in court. A video tape deposition may be an attractive
way to preserve and present testimony, but it falls far short of
214. "Where it is reasonable to infer that an insurance company is attempting
to use § 521 as a means of postponing and perhaps defeating liability . .. the tri-
al court is justified in refusing to injure the plaintiff for the sole advantage of the
insurance company." Hackman v. Postel, 675 F. Supp. 1132, 1134 (N.D. I1. 1988).
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enabling a party to prosecute or defend his case at trial.
Countless decisions by a party in the trial of a case are predi-
cated upon events as they develop. The opponent of an absent
party will always have the edge.215
215. See generally Dwan V. Kerig, The Absent Defendant and the Federal Soldiets'
and Sailos' Civil Relief Act, 33 N.Y.U. L. REV. 975 (1958).
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